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P 181813Z FEB 76

FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1434

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 6 MBFR VIENNA 0058

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: INFOMAL SESSION WITH EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES OF
FEBRUARY 17, 1976

REF: (A) MBFR VIENNA 0051 (DTG 171912 FEB 76),

(B) MBFR VIENNA 0054 (DTG 181342 FEB 76)

1. BEGIN SUMMARY: IN THE FEBRUARY 17 INFORMAL SESSION OF
THE VIENNA TALKS, THE ALLIES WERE REPRESENTED BY THE
CANADIAN REP, FRG REP AND U. S. REP, AND THE EAST BY SOVIET
REPS KHLESTOV AND SHUSTOV, CZECHOSLOVAK REP LAHODA, AND
GDR REP OESER.

2. AT THE OUTSET OF THE SESSION, CZECHOSLOVAK REP PRESENTED A
FORCEFUL, COMPREHENSIVE CRITICISM OF THE DECEMBER 16 WESTERN
PROPOSALS, CLAIMING THEY STILL GIVE WEST UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE.
WESTERN REPS REFUTED THIS ARGUMENTATION, POINTING OUT THAT

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WHEN EVERYTHING WAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING THE

MILITARY VALUE OF THE REDUCTIONS THE WEST PROPOSED, THE WEIGHT OF THE LIMITATIONS THE WEST WOULD ACCEPT, AND THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT VERY LARGE FORCES IN THE USSR--WHOSE TERRITORY ADJOINS THE AREA--WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO SIMILAR LIMITATIONS, THEN IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THE WEST WAS OFFERING AT LEAST AS MUCH AS IT WAS ASKING FOR. HENCE IT COULD NOT BE CONTENDED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD GIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST AT THE EXPENSE OF EASTERN SECURITY.

3. AFTER A BRIEF RESUME OF EASTERN ARGUMENTS AGAINST WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH, KHESTOV PRESENTED A NEW PROPOSAL ON BEHALF OF EASTERN GOVERNMENTS, HANDING OVER RUSSIAN LANGUAGE TEXT. INFORMAL WESTERN TRANSLATION APPEARS BELOW. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS APPEARING IN TEXT, KHESTOV MADE CLEAR THAT EASTERN PROPOSAL FORESEES THAT U.S. AND SOVIETS SHOULD REDUCE NUCLEAR FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE AS WELL AS THE FIRST AND THAT REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD ALSO REDUCE NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES IN THE SECOND STAGE. WESTERN REPS ASKED A NUMBER OF FACTUAL QUESTIONS FOR CLARITY OF UNDERSTANDING ABOUT EASTERN PROPOSAL. KHESTOV NOTED THE QUESTIONS, BUT ANSWERED ONLY ONE, TO EFFECT THAT, IN THE SECOND STAGE OF NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL, WITHDRAWN UK AND CANADIAN FORCES SHOULD ALSO BE DISBANDED. SPEAKING FOR THE ALLIES, U.S. REP SAID THAT WESTERN REPS WOULD REPORT EASTERN PROPOSAL TO THEIR COLLEAGUES AND THAT WESTERN REPS WOULD GIVE THEIR COMMENTS IN DUE COURSE, BUT THAT HE WISHED TO AGAIN DRAW THE ATTENTION OF EASTERN REPS TO THE FACT THAT WESTERN PARTICIPANTS ATTACHED GREAT IMPORTANCE TO THEIR DECEMBER 16 PROPOSALS. THESE PROPOSALS PROVIDED AN EQUITABLE AND COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO THE MAJOR ISSUES OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING THE REQUIREMENT TO REACH APPROXIMATE PARITY OF GROUND FORCES. FOR THESE REASONS, WESTERN REPS BELIEVED THAT THEIR PROPOSALS REPRESENTED THE RIGHT APPROACH TO AN AGREEMENT. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. IN THE FIRST STAGE- IN THE COURSE OF 1976-THE REDUCTION IS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN CENTRAL EUROPE OF THE ARMED FORCES ONLY OF THE USSR AND THE USA BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE (APPROXIMATELY 2-3 PER

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CENT) OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND OF NATO IN THIS AREA.

2. IN THIS REGARD A SPECIFIC REDUCTION IS ENVISAGED ON EACH SIDE OF 300 TANKS-2-3 TANK REGIMENTS, 2-3 BRIGADES; 54 NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT 1/ (SOVIET "FITTER" AND AMERICAN F-4) AND ALSO AN EQUAL NUMBER (COMMENT: AMBIGUOUS AS TO ACTUAL AMOUNT INVOLVED. END COMMENT) OF OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILE

LAUNCHERS (SOVIET "SCUD-B" AND AMERICAN "PERSHING") (COMMENT: KHLESTOV USED TERM "BALLISTIC LAUNCHERS" IN READING OUT AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION PREPARED BY SOVIET DEL. END COMMENT) TOGETHER WITH A DEFINITE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THESE DELIVERY SYSTEMS; 36 AIR DEFENSE GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCHERS (SOVIET "SAM-2" AND AMERICAN "NIKE HERCULES," ZHAWK"); ONE ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS WITH COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE UNITS.

3. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES, ALL OTHER STATES HAVING FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE TO ASSUME CLEARLY FORMULATED OBLIGATIONS TO "FREEZE" AT THE PRESENT LEVEL THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND TO REDUCE THESE FORCES IN THE SUBSEQUENT STAGE (1977-1978) SO THAT AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS IN BOTH STAGES ALL STATES PARTICIPATING IN THEM WILL HAVE REDUCED THEIR ARMED FORCES BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE.

4. THE REDUCTION OF FORCES IS TO BE EFFECTED BY ENTIRE MILITARY SUB-UNITS AND OTHER FORMATIONS TOGETHER WITH THE CORRESPONDING ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, AND NOT BY INDIVIDUAL SERVICEMEN TAKEN FROM DIFFERENT UNITS.

5. THE REDUCED SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN TO THEIR OWN TERRITORY, WHERE THEY ARE TO BE DISBANDED. END TEXT.

1/ LITERALLY "DELIVERY AIRCRAFT"

4. CZECHOSLOVAK REP AS HOST WELCOMED PARTICIPANTS. HE SAID THAT IN THE INFORMAL SESSION OF FEBRUARY 3 EASTERN REPS HAD SHOWN THE REASONS WHICH MADE THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 16 UNSATISFACTORY. EASTERN REPS HAD VERY MINUTELY STUDIED EVERYTHING SAID BY WESTERN REPS WITH REGARD TO THIS PROPOSAL. THEY WOULD LIKE IN ADDITION TO
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WHAT THEY HAD ALREADY EXPLAINED TO MAKE A FEW ADDITIONAL POINTS ON IT. AS WESTERN REPS WOULD REMEMBER, WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL PROVIDED FOR EQUAL COMMITMENTS ON REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. (AT THIS POINT, SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SHUSTOV CORRECTED CZECH REP POINTING OUT THAT WESTERN REPS HAD NOT CLAIMED THAT COMMITMENTS WERE "EQUAL" BUT RATHER "EQUITABLE.") WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THEIR PROPOSAL DID NOT TEND TO CHANGE THE MUTUAL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE TO THE ADVANTAGE OF THE NATO PARTICIPANTS. IN UK REP'S PLENARY STATEMENT OF FEBRUARY 12, LATTER HAD STRESSED THAT WESTERN PROPOSAL COULD PROVIDE AN EQUITABLE AND PRACTICAL BASIS FOR WORKING OUT AN AGREEMENT. WAS THIS REALLY THE CASE? DID THE MOVE MADE BY WESTERN COUNTRIES ALTER IN ANY WAY THE UNACCEPTABLE SUBSTANCE OF THE

POSITION PREVIOUSLY ADVANCED BY THE NATO COUNTRIES?

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FROM US REP MBFR

5. CZECHOSLOVAK REP CONTINUED THAT, ON DECEMBER 16, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES HAD SAID THEY WERE PREPARED TO CARRY OUT A ONE-TIME REDUCTION OF A PART OF THE US NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA UNDER THE CONDITION THAT THE EASTERN COUNTRIES ACCEPT THE ENTIRE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS. EASTERN REPS HAD ON MANY OCCASIONS SHOWN AND EXPLAINED IN DETAIL WHY THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS WAS UNACCEPTABLE FOR THEM, THIS MEANT THE ENTIRE SCHEME. WITHOUT REPEATING ALL THEIR ARGUMENTS, HE WOULD POINT OUT SOME OF THE POINTS OF THE WESTERN SCHEME WHICH WERE PREVENTING AGREEMENT IN THE VIENNA TALKS AND IMPEDING THE WORKING OUT OF A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AND JUST REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

6. CZECHOSLVAK REP CONTINUED THAT, AS HE HAD SAID IN THE SESSION OF FEBRUARY 3, THE EASTERN COUNTRIES HAD STRESSED

THAT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT ON ARMED FORCES AND
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ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE COULD ONLY BE REACHED IF ALL PARTICIPANTS UNDERTOOK CONCRETE COMMITMENTS AS TO THE TIMING AND SCOPE OF THEIR REDUCTIONS. THE WESTERN SCHEME DID NOT PROVIDE FOR SUCH COMMITMENTS. DID THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DECEMBER 16 CLEARLY ANSWER THE QUESTION OF WITH WHAT SCOPE OR TIMING THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA WOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES AND ARMAMENTS? THE PROPOSAL CERTAINLY DID NOT DO SO. AS PREVIOUSLY, THESE PARTICIPATING STATES WERE REFRAINING FROM ASSUMING SUCH COMMITMENTS. THIS BASIC DEFECT OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL THUS REMAINED.

7. CZECHOSLOVAK REP ASKED, DID THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSAL MEAN THAT THE WESTERN STATES WERE NOW READY TO ALTER THEIR SCHEME AND TO ACCEPT REDUCTION OF ALL TYPES OF FORCES, ARMAMENTS, ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT AS WAS INDISPENSABLE IF PARTICIPANTS WISHED TO REDUCE THE CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS PROVIDED FOR IN THE FINAL COMMUNIQUE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS? THE ANSWER AGAIN WAS, CERTAINLY NOT. MOREOVER, ACCORDING TO THE WESTERN PROPOSAL, REDUCTIONS WOULD NOT INCLUDE EITHER AIR FORCE MANPOWER NOR WOULD THEY COVER A MAJOR PART OF THE ARMAMENTS AND EQUIPMENT HELD BY NATO FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. AS THE U. S. REPRESENTATIVE HAD EXPLAINED IN THE DECEMBER 16 PLENARY, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WAS AN ONE- TIME OFFER AND NOT A STEP TOWARDS FURTHER REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT. SUCH AN APPROACH--THIS SHOULD BE CLEAR TO WESTERN REPS--WAS IN CONTRADICTION TO THE UNDERSTANDING REACHED IN THE PREPARATORY TALKS ACCORDING TO WHICH THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WAS THE MUTUAL REDUCTION NOT ONLY OF MANPOWER BUT OF ARMAMENTS AS WELL.

8. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT EASTERN ANALYSIS OF THE NEW PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE NATO COUNTRIES SHOWED THAT, AS BEFORE, THEIR CENTER OF GRAVITY WAS TO BE FOUND IN ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS. THESE WOULD BE INEQUITABLE FOR THE SOCIALIST STATES SINCE THE LATTER WOULD HAVE TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES ALMOST THREE TIMES MORE THAN THE WEST. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID HE WISHED TO REPEAT THAT EASTERN REPS WOULD NOT
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ACCEPT ANYTHING OF THIS KIND. PARTICIPANTS MUST REDUCE ON A FOOTING OF EQUALITY.

9. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT, IN THEIR NEW PROPOSALS AS BEFORE, WESTERN PARTICIPANTS CONTINUED TO INSIST THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF A COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING WHICH WOULD CONTRACTUALIZE THE RIGHT OF INDIVIDUAL WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO INCREASE THE MANPOWER OF NATO MEMBER STATES EVEN BEYOND THE PRESENT LEVEL. EASTERN REPS COULD NOT APPROVE OF SUCH AN IDEA SINCE IT CONTRADICTED THE BASIC CONCEPT OF MUTUAL REDUCTIONS OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

10. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID WESTERN REPS CONTENTED THAT THE CARRYING OUT OF A ONE-TIME REDUCTION OF A CERTAIN PART OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE AREA WAS SOMEHOW EQUATED TO THOSE REDUCTIONS TO BE CARRIED OUT BY THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS. EASTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE BEING ASKED TO AGREE WITH THE IDEA THAT, FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THE WITHDRAWAL OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY OF 68,000 MEN AND 1700 TANKS WOULD BE THE EQUIVALENT OF THE WITHDRAWAL OF 29,000 SOLDIERS AS INDIVIDUALS AND OF A CERTAIN QUANTITY OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS. WAS THERE ANY JUSTIFICATION FOR SUCH CLAIMS?

11. CZECHSLOVAK REP SAID HIS COMMENTS ON THIS POINT WERE THAT FIRST, FROM THE VERY OUTSET OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE EASTERN STATES HAD STATED THEIR READINESS TO REDUCE ON THE BASIS OF EQUALITY ALL TYPES OF ARMAMENTS INCLUDING COMBAT WEAPONS. THEY THEREFORE SAW IN THE DECEMBER 16 PROPOSAL RECOGNITION OF THE OBVIOUS FACT THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO REDUCE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WITHOUT INCLUDING IN THE REDUCTION THE MOST TERRIBLE MEANS OF DESTRUCTION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS WAS WHY ALL STATES WHICH HAD MEANS OF NUCLEAR DELIVERY IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD REDUCE THEM, NOT ONLY ONE COUNTRY, THE UNITED STATES. SECOND, NEITHER FROM THE MILITARY NOR FROM ANY OTHER POINT OF VIEW COULD IT BE CLAIMED THAT REDUCTION OF SUCH UTTERLY DIFFERENT AND NON-COMPARABLE TYPES OF ARMAMENTS AS U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOVIET TANKS WOULD REPRESENT EQUITABLE
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REDUCTIONS BY THOSE TWO COUNTRIES. HE WISHED TO ASK WHAT CRITERIA UNDERLAY THE WESTERN PROPOSAL. AS FAR AS THE EASTERN REPS KNEW, THERE WAS NO CRITERION WHICH MIGHT PERMIT THE ASSERTION THAT, FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THE REDUCTION OF A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS THE EQUIVALENT OF A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TANKS. TO THE CONTRARY, YEARS OF EXPERIENCE IN NEGOTIATIONS ON ARMAMENT REDUCTIONS HAD

DEMONSTRATED THAT ALL EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH CRITERIA FOR
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS HAD BEEN IN VAIN.
IT WAS NOT BY CHANCE THAT, IN A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT
OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONGRESS IN MAY 1973, THE PRESIDENT
HAD STRESSED THAT IT MIGHT BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO SET
UP AN EQUIVALENCY BETWEEN DIFFERENT WEAPONS SYSTEMS.
THERE WAS NO FOUNDATION WHICH MIGHT PERMIT WESTERN
REPS TO CLAIM THAT THE REDUCTION OF SUCH RADICALLY DIFFERENT
ARMAMENTS AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND TANKS WHICH THEY PROPOSED
STOOD ON THE FOOTING OF EQUALITY.

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FROM US REP MBFR

12. CZECHOSLOVAK REP SAID THAT, THEREFORE, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL
TO CARRY OUT REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS OF DIFFERENT TYPES COULD
NOT BE CONSIDERED EQUITABLE SINCE IT CONFLICTED WITH THE AGREED
PRINCIPLES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF
ALL PARTICIPANTS. THE BASIC DEFECT OF THE WESTERN SCHEME, THAT
IT WOULD PROVIDE UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST,
REMAINED UNCHANGED EVEN AFTER THE INCLUSION OF THE DEC 16 PROPOSAL.
THE AIM OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS WAS TO WORK OUT A MUTUALLY

ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION LEADING TO GENUINE MILITARY DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND TO ENHANCE STABILITY IN THE AREA. THE WESTERN SCHEME EVEN WITH THE DEC 16 ADDITIONS COULD NOT PROVIDE A BASIS FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT. EASTERN REPS THEREFORE URGED WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO RECONSIDER AND TO ADOPT A MORE REALISTIC POSITION IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

13. FRG REP SAID HE WISHED TO REPLY TO REMARKS OF CZECHOSLOVAK REP. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, FRG REP SAID THAT, IN THE WESTERN VIEW, THESE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD
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DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE BASIC SECURITY PROBLEM IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THAT PROBLEM, AS ALLIED REPS HAD FREQUENTLY DEMONSTRATED, RESULTED FROM THE LARGE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND TANKS IN THE AREA, DISPARITIES WHOSE EFFECTS WERE INTENSIFIED BY GEOGRAPHY. TO DEAL CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THIS PROBLEM REQUIRED THAT THE EAST REDUCE TANKS AND A LARGER NUMBER OF SOLDIERS THAN THE WEST. THAT HAD BEEN AND REMAINED THE WEST'S BASIC POSITION.

14. FRG REP SAID THAT THE EASTERN APPROACH, CALLING FOR REDUCTIONS BY EQUAL NUMBERS AND EQUAL PERCENTAGES, DID NOT DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. TO THE CONTRARY, IT WOULD MAKE IT WORSE. UNDER THE EASTERN APPROACH, THE EASTERN PREPONDERANCE IN GROUND FORCES

WOULD BE PRESERVED. WESTERN SECURITY WOULD BE DIMINISHED BECAUSE REDUCED WESTERN GROUND FORCES, WHILE STILL FACING THE GREATLY SUPERIOR EASTERN GROUND FORCES, WOULD STILL HAVE TO DEFEND THE SAME EXTENT OF TERRITORY AS BEFORE AN AGREEMENT. THE EAST WOULD GAIN A UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE AT THE EXPENSE OF WESTERN SECURITY, IN THAT THE WEST WOULD FOREGO IN AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT THE OPTION IT CURRENTLY HAD OF MAKING INCREASES TO MATCH THE STRENGTH OF THE EASTERN GROUND FORCES.

15. FRG REP CONTINUED THAT THE EAST, MOREOVER, WOULD GAIN MORE THAN THE WEST FROM THE LIMITATIONS ARISING FROM AN AGREEMENT. THIS WAS TRUE FOR ANY AGREEMENT -- TTDN AS WELL AS THE EASTERN ONE. THIS WAS SO BECAUSE, WHILE ALL FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE LIMITED, THE VERY MUCH LARGER SOVIET FORCES LOCATED INSIDE THE SOVIET UNION WOULD NOT BE LIMITED. BUT THE SOVIET UNION WAS LOCATED IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, AND THE FORCES ON ITS TERRITORY HAD RAPID AND EASY ACCESS TO THE AREA. THIS EXTRA ADVANTAGE TO THE EAST ARISING FROM THESE FACTS WOULD BE EVEN GREATER UNDER THE EASTERN APPROACH THAN UNDER THE WESTERN APPROACH. FIRST, UNDER THE EASTERN APPROACH, THIS EXTRA ADVANTAGE WAS NOT OFFSET BY LARGER EASTERN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER REDUCTIONS. SECOND, UNDER THE EASTERN APPROACH, ALL FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE REDUCED AND LIMITED. THUS, THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD

PERPETUATE THE EXISTING WARSAW PACT ADVANTAGES IN THE AREA,
TFNOT ONLY IN MANPOWER, BUT IN MAJOR ARMAMENTS AS WELL. THE FACT
THAT THE VERY LARGE FORCES OF THE USSR IN ITS ADJACENT TERRITORY
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WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO THIS WIDE RANGE OF MANPOWER AND ARMAMENT
LIMITATIONS WOULD COMPOUND THE EASTERN ADVANTAGE FROM THEIR
PROPOSAL. FOR ALL THESE REASONS, THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD
INTENSIFY, RATHER THAN RESOLVE, THE SECURITY PROBLEM ARISING
FROM THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA.
THAT WAS WHY THE WEST COULD NOT REGARD THE EASTERN REDUCTION
APPROACH AS A CONSTRUCTIVE SOLUTION.

16. FRG REP SAID THAT AN AGREEMENT ALONG THE LINES THE ALLIES
HAD PROPOSED OVER THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS
WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN A REAL ENHANCEMENT OF STABILITY AND
SECURITY TO THE MUTUAL BENEFIT OF BOTH SIDES. WESTERN REPS
HAD POINTED OUT THE FACT THAT, EVEN UNDER THE ALLIED PROPOSAL,
LIMITATIONS ARISING OUT OF A REDUCTIONS AGREEMENT WOULD BE OF
GREATER BENEFIT TO THE EAST THAN TO THE WEST, OFFSETTING THE
LARGER REDUCTIONS THE WEST WAS ASKING FOR. NEVERTHELESS, EASTERN
REPS HAD CONTINUED TO MAINTAIN THEIR UNCONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH.
THIS HAD RESULTED IN AN IMPASSE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. IN THIS
SITUATION, THE WESTERN GOVERNMENTS HAD MADE A DECISIVE MOVE TO
BRING ABOUT AGREEMENT. ON DEC 16, THE WEST HAD OFFERED TO ADD
A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN US WARHEADS, LONG-RANGE SURFACE-TO-
SURFACE BALLISTIC LAUNCHERS AND NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT IN THE
AREA TO ITS PREVIOUS REDUCTION PROPOSALS, WITHOUT ASKING FOR
ANY ADDITIONAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS. THE WESTERN OFFER INCLUDED
WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT LIMITATIONS ON THE RESIDUAL LEVELS OF THE
US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OF THE TYPES REDUCED.

17. FRG REP SAID THAT UNDERLYING THE NEW WESTERN OFFER WAS A
CONCEPT WHICH SHOULD PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR REACHING AGREEMENT IN
THESE TALKS, A WAY TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEM EASTERN REPS HAD SEEN
WITH EARLIER ALLIED PROPOSALS AND WHICH MET THE BASIC PROBLEM
WESTERN REPS SAW WITH THE EAST'S APPROACH. ALLIED REPS CALLED
THE CONCEPT UNDERLYING THIS AUGMENTED PROPOSAL THE "MIXED PACKAGE
CONCEPT," BECAUSE ITS COMPONENTS ON EACH SIDE, THE REDUCTIONS
AND THEIR ASSOCIATED LIMITATIONS, WERE DIFFERENT. TAKEN TOGETHER,
OF COURSE, THEY MADE WHAT THE WEST WAS WILLING TO UNDERTAKE AT
LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT IT WAS ASKING FROM THE EAST. WHAT THE WEST
WAS PROPOSING UNDER THIS NEW CONCEPT CLEARLY OFFSET THE LARGER
GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS THE ALLIES WERE ASKING THE EAST TO TAKE:
IT ADDED A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF US NUCLEAR
ELEMENTS TO THE WEST'S PREVIOUSLY OFFERED REDUCTIONS AND
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LIMITATIONS.

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FROM US REP MBFR

18. FRG REP SAID THAT WHEN EVERYTHING WAS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, INCLUDING THE MILITARY VALUE OF THE REDUCTIONS THE ALLIES PROPOSED, THE WEIGHT OF THE LIMITATIONS THE WEST WOULD ACCEPT, AND THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT VERY LARGE FORCES IN THE USSR -- WHOSE TERRITORY ADJOINED THE AREA-- WOULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO SIMILAR LIMITATIONS, THEN IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THE WEST WAS OFFERING AT LEAST AS MUCH AS IT WAS ASKING FOR. BECAUSE THE ALLIES WERE OFFERING AT LEAST AS MUCH AS THEY WERE ASKING FOR, IT COULD NOT BE CONTENDED THAT THE AGREEMENT THE WEST PROPOSED WOULD GIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST AT THE EXPENSE OF EASTERN SECURITY. IT SHOULD BE CLEAR THAT THE WESTERN APPROACH PROVIDED AN EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF FINDING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE WAY TO ACHIEVE THE AGREED GOALS OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.

19. FRG REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE NEXT TO TURN TO THE TWO QUESTIONS EASTERN REPS HAD RAISED ABOUT THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS IN THE FEB 3 INFORMAL SESSION. FIRST, EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED
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TO WHICH NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS THE 1,000 US WARHEADS OFFERED FOR WITHDRAWAL WERE ASSIGNED. ALLIED REPS HAD TOLD THE EAST THAT THE WESTERN OFFER INCLUDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF 1,000 US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, WESTERN REPS WERE NOT PREPARED TO SPECIFY THE TYPES OF WARHEADS INVOLVED. THE PROPOSED REDUCTION WOULD ENTAIL A LIMITATION OF THE RESIDUAL NUMBER OF US NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE AREA. THIS LIMITATION WOULD COVER ALL TYPES OF US WARHEADS IN THE AREA, WHATEVER DELIVERY SYSTEM THEY MIGHT BE ASSIGNED TO. THE LIMITATION WOULD REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR THE PERIOD OF DURATION OF AN AGREEMENT. THE WEST WAS CONSIDERING MODERNIZATION OF SOME NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN THE AREA. UNLESS THERE WAS A LIMITATION BY AGREEMENT, MODERNIZATION WOULD NOT NECESSARILY LEAD TO REDUCTION OF THE NUMERICAL IEL OF WARHEADS. TO THE CONTRARY, MODERNIZATION COULD IN LONG RUN

LEAD TO INCREASES. IT WAS EVIDENT THAT A LIMITATION ON THE TOTAL NUMBER OF US WARHEADS IN THE AREA WAS OF GREAT SIGNIFICANCE.

20. FRG REP SAID EASTERN REPS HAD ALSO COMMENTED IN THE FEB 3 INFORMAL SESSION THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD NOT PROVIDE FOR REDUCTION OF AIR FORCES AND WOULD EVEN ALLOW FOR A CERTAIN INCREASE OF SUCH FORCES IN CERTAIN CONDITIONS. ALLIED REPS HAD TOLD THE EAST THAT THE NEW WESTERN PROPOSALS DID NOT ALTER THE POSITION THAT THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WOULD NOT ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT REQUIRING REDUCTIONS OF THEIR AIR MANPOWER. THROUGHOUT THESE NEGOTIATIONS, ALLIED REPS HAD MADE CLEAR THAT THE FOCUS OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD BE ON GROUND FORCES. THIS WAS WHY THE WEST HAD MAINTAINED ITS REQUIREMENT FOR A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WITHIN THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING THE ALLIES HAD PROPOSED FOR GROUND AND AIR FORCE MANPOWER COMBINED. IT WAS TRUE THAT THIS WOULD ALLOW EITHER SIDE TO INCREASE ITS AIR FORCE MANPOWER, BUT THIS COULD ONLY BE DONE AT THE EXPENSE OF GROUND FORCE MANPOWER FALLING BELOW THE LEVEL PERMITTED BY THE GROUND FORCE COMMON CEILING. WESTERN REPS WERE READY TO ANSWER FURTHER QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DEC 16 PROPOSALS WHICH EASTERN REPS MIGHT HAVE IN THIS SESSION OR LATER.

21. GDR REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS. THE REMARKS OF THE FRG REP WERE NOT A COMPLETE REPLY TO THE DETAILED AND WELL-FOUNDED ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SESSION IN LATTER'S ASSESSMENT OF THE WESTERN
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PROPOSALS INCLUDING THAT OF DEC 16. FRG REP HAD ONCE AGAIN ONLY MENTIONED SOME ISOLATED FEATURES. THE WESTERN EXPLANATION WAS UNREALISTIC. AGREED REDUCTIONS MUST INCLUDE ALL KINDS OF ARMAMENTS INCLUDING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. FRG REP HAD ALSO NOT RESPONDED TO CZECHOSLOVAK REP'S POINT WHERE LATTER HAD MADE CLEAR THAT COMMITMENTS BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WERE IMPORTANT. FRG REP'S REMARKS INDICATED THAT WESTERN REPS WERE STILL NOT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL FORCES IN THE AREA INCLUDING NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS. THE EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE WESTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL PRESENTED BY WESTERN REPS WAS STILL NOT WELL ARGUED. WESTERN REPS HAD ONCE AGAIN USED THE ARGUMENT OF GEOGRAPHIC DISPARITIES WHICH LEFT OUT OF ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT THAT THERE HAD BEEN AGREEMENT TO THE REDUCTION AREA. THE WESTERN REPS HAD SAID THAT THEIR PROPOSAL FORESAW EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS AND WAS NOT INTENDED TO CHANGE THE BALANCE OF FORCES. BUT FRG REP HAD NOT PROVED THAT THE WESTERN OFFER WAS EQUITABLE. EASTERN ARGUMENTS ON THIS POINT THEREFORE REMAINED VALID.

THE WESTERN THEORY OF A MIXED PACKAGE WAS NOT REALISTIC. HE FOUND IT A LITTLE STRANGE THAT WESTERN REPS SAID THEIR PROPOSALS WOULD GIVE EAST ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES. DID THIS MEAN WESTERN REPS WERE DISTANCING THEMSELVES FROM THEIR OWN PROPOSAL? WESTERN REPS SHOULD AT LEAST STICK TO THEIR PROPOSALS?

22. FRG REP SAID WESTERN REPS WERE DEFINITELY STICKING TO THEIR PROPOSALS. BECAUSE OF GEOGRAPHY, THE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN ANY AGREEMENT WOULD HAVE INEQUITABLE ADVANTAGES FOR THE EAST. GDR REP SAID FRG REP HAD NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OFFERED EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS WITH NO CHANGE IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES. THE EASTERN APPROACH, TO THE CONTRARY, AS EASTERN REPS HAD PATIENTLY AND CONSISTENTLY ATTEMPTED TO SHOW, WOULD GUARANTEE EQUITABLE REDUCTIONS AND NO CHANGE IN THE BALANCE OF FORCES IN THE AREA AND THUS GUARANTEE THE SECURITY OF ALL. ON 8 NOV 1973, THE SOCIALIST STATES HAD SUBMITTED THEIR WELL-KNOWN DRAFT AGREEMENT WHICH FULLY CORRESPONDED TO THE AGREED SUBJECT MATTER AND PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTION TO THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS, WHILE ALSO CONFORMING WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLES. THIS WAS NOT THE CASE WITH THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS. IT REMAINED FOR THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO BRING THEIR POSITION INTO LINE WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLES.

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INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY

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USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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23. GDR REP SAID THAT, IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE EASTERN DELEGATIONS HAD SUBMITTED ADDITIONAL PROPOSALS TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE WESTERN POSITION. THESE HAD INCLUDED THE INITIAL REDUCTION STEP PROPOSAL PROVIDING THAT, IN 1976 THE U.S. AND USSR WOULD CARRY OUT THE FIRST REDUCTIONS AND THE PROPOSAL FOR THE NON-INCREASE OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF ALL PARTICIPANTS. ALL THESE INITIATIVES HAD BEEN TAKEN WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF CONTRIBUTING TO REAL PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. EASTERN REPS WISHED TO STRESS THAT THE PROPOSALS SUBMITTED BY THE EASTERN STATES WERE AIMED AT ACHIEVING TANGIBLE RESULTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AND TO ENABLE GENUINELY EQUITABLE MUTUAL SOLUTIONS. THE WESTERN STATES HAD NEITHER ACCEPTED NOR GIVEN A POSITIVE REACTION TO THESE PROPOSALS. AS A RESULT, PARTICIPANTS HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO DRAFT AN AGREEMENT. THESE EASTERN PROPOSALS WERE STILL ON THE TABLE AND EASTERN PARTICIPANTS STILL EXPECTED AN APPROPRIATE WESTERN REACTION.

24. CANADIAN REP SAID HE WISHED TO MAKE A FEW COMMENTS. DRAWING
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ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AID HOC GROUP, CANADIAN REP SAID THAT WESTERN REPS CONTINUED TO BE DISAPPOINTED BY THE NEGATIVE CHARACTER OF THE EASTERN REACTION THUS FAR TO THE WEST'S NEW PROPOSALS. ON THE PRESENT OCCASION EASTERN REPS HAD AGAIN CRITICIZED THE ALLIED PROPOSALS AND HAD AGAIN CONTENDED THAT, DESPITE THIS ADDITION, THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH WOULD GIVE UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST. THESE COMMENTS SUGGESTED THAT THE EAST STILL HAD NOT CORRECTLY ASSESSED THE FULL SIGNIFICANCE OF WHAT THE WEST HAD PROPOSED.

25. CANADIAN REP SAID THAT, THROUGHOUT THE PAST TWO YEARS, EASTERN REPS HAD ASKED FOR REDUCTIONS IN WESTERN NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS, INCLUDING AIRCRAFT. THE EAST HAD STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE TO IT OF SUCH REDUCTIONS. THE WEST HAD NOW PROPOSED A VERY SIGNIFICANT REDUCTION OF US NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS, AND WITHOUT ASKING FOR INCREASED REDUCTIONS FROM THE EAST. THE PROPOSED REDUCTION OF US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT AND PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS WAS AN ADDITION OF GREAT MILITARY VALUE TO THE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED WESTERN REDUCTIONS. THE 1,000 NUCLEAR WARHEADS, THE 54 NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT, AND THE 36 PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS THE WEST HAD OFFERED TO WITHDRAW FROM US FORCES IN THE AREA REPRESENTED A SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTION OF WESTERN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE TWO DELIVERY SYSTEMS INVOLVED WERE THE MOST POTENT ARMAMENTS IN NATO FORCES IN THE AREA. MOREOVER, IN HIS PLENARY STATEMENT OF FEB 5, THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD APPEARED TO ACCEPT THAT THESE WESTERN REDUCTIONS WERE OF GREAT MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE. IT WAS UNNECESSARY TO STRESS THE ENORMOUS FIREPOWER OF THESE PROPOSED WESTERN WITHDRAWALS.

26. CANADIAN REP SAID THE NEW WESTERN OFFER WOULD RESULT IN LIMITATIONS ON THE RESIDUAL LEVELS OF US ARMAMENTS OF THESE TYPES, AN ELEMENT OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. THIS WAS THE FIRST TIME THAT THE WEST HAD MADE A PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL AND LIMITATION OF ANY US TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT. WITH THIS ONE-TIME INITIATIVE, THE WEST HAD INTRODUCED A MAJOR NEW FACTOR INTO ITS PROPOSALS. THE ALLIED OFFER WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY INCREASE THE BURDENS ASSUMED BY THE WEST UNDER AN AGREEMENT, AND INCREASE THE BENEFITS TO THE EAST. BECAUSE WHAT THE WEST WAS OFFERING TO UNDERTAKE WAS AT LEAST
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EQUAL TO WHAT THE ALLIES WERE ASKING OF THE EAST, THERE WAS NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CONTENTION THAT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE WESTERN PROPOSALS WOULD RESULT IN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST AT THE EXPENSE OF EASTERN SECURITY. CANADIAN REP ASKED WHAT UNILATERAL DISADVANTAGE EASTERN REPS CONSIDERED THAT THE EAST WOULD SUFFER FROM SUCH AN AGREEMENT.

27. U.S. REP SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A SHORT COMMENT ON THE REMARKS MADE BY CZECHOSLOVAK AND GDR REPS IN THE PRESENT SESSION. THESE REPRESENTATIVES HAD REFERRED TO WESTERN STATEMENTS IN THE FEB 3 INFORMAL SESSION THAT THE WESTERN PROPOSALS PROVIDED AN EQUITABLE BASIS FOR AGREEMENT AND THEY HAD ALSO REFERRED TO WESTERN REMARKS THAT SESSION AS TO THE EFFECTS OF THE WESTERN PROPOSAL ON THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES. DRAWING ON TALKING POINTS APPROVED BY THE AD HOC GROUP, U.S. REP SAID THAT WHAT WESTERN REPS HAD SAID IN THE FEB 3 INFORMAL WAS THAT "BECAUSE WHAT THE ALLIES WERE OFFERING TO DO ON THE WESTERN SIDE AS AT LEAST EQUAL TO WHAT THEY WERE ASKING FOR FROM THE EAST, IT COULD NOT BE CONTENDED THAT THE WEST WAS AIMING AT CHANGING THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL EUROPE TO ITS ADVANTAGE." HE WISHED TO MAKE CLEAR EXACTLY WHAT ALLIED REPS HAD IN MIND IN MAKING THIS STATEMENT. THE WESTERN AIM IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS -- AS RECORDED IN THE 28 JUNE 1973 COMMUNIQUE -- WAS " TO CONTRIBUTE TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE" WHILE LEAVING THE SECURITY OF EACH PARTY UNDIMINISHED. THIS OBJECTIVE COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED IF THE PRESENT QUANTITATIVE RELATIONSHIP OF THE GROUND FORCES OF EAST AND WEST IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WAS PRESERVED UNCHANGED. ON THE CONTRARY, THIS OBJECTIVE REQUIRED DEALING WITH THE DISPARITIES IN GROUND FORCE PERSONNEL AND IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS WHICH WERE THE MAJOR DESTABILIZING FACTORS IN THE MILITARY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE WESTERN PARTICIPANTS WERE CONVINCED THAT AN AGREEMENT MUST BRING ABOUT PARITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WHILE PROVIDING FOR A REDUCTION OF THE EXISTING DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS.

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AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE PRIORITY
USCINCEUR PRIORITY

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28. U.S. REP CONTINUED THAT, IF ALL RELEVANT FACTORS WERE
CONSIDERED, INCLUDING:

FIRST, THE UNALTERABLE GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES OF THE EAST;

SECOND, THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES WHICH THE EAST WOULD GAIN
THROUGH A LIMITATION OF WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS;

THIRD, THE GREAT MILITARY IMPORTANCE OF THE NEW WESTERN OFFER
TO REDUCE AND LIMIT A SIGNIFICANT AMOUNT OF U.S. NUCLEAR
ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

FOURTH, THE PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED WESTERN REDUCTIONS
AND LIMITATIONS.

IF ALL OF THESE FACTORS WERE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT, IT WAS OBVIOUS
THAT THE WEST WAS OFFERING AT LEAST AS MUCH AS IT WAS ASKING
FOR, AND THAT THERE WAS THEREFORE NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THE
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CONTENTION THAT AN AGREEMENT BASED ON THE WESTERN PROPOSAL WOULD
RESULT IN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE TO THE WEST AT THE EXPENSE OF
EASTERN SECURITY. IT WAS IN THIS SENSE THAT WESTERN REPS HAD
MADE THE POINT THAT THE WEST WAS NOT AIMING AT CHANGING THE
OVERALL RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WITH RESPECT TO CENTRAL EUROPE
TO ITS ADVANTAGE.

29. KHLESTOV SAID HE FIRST WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THE SAME
POINT JUST MADE BY THE GDR REP, NAMELY, THAT THE PROGRAM
PRESENTED BY THE EASTERN COUNTRIES, CONSISTING OF THE DRAFT
AGREEMENT OF 8 NOV 1973 AND OF A NUMBER OF SUBSEQUENT PROPOSALS
WHICH THE EASTERN COUNTRIES HAD PRESENTED DURING THE COURSE
OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THAT ALL THESE PROPOSALS HAD PROVIDED A
FULL POSSIBILITY OF WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT.
THE FACT THAT PARTICIPANTS HAD TO DATE FAILED TO WORK OUT AN
AGREEMENT WAS THE RESULT OF THE RELUCTANCE OF THE WESTERN
PARTICIPANTS TO ACCEPT THE EQUITABLE EASTERN PROPOSALS. IN THE
COURSE OF THE PRESENT ROUND AND PREVIOUSLY, EASTERN REPS HAD
GIVEN A WELL-FOUNDED AND CONVINCING DEMONSTRATION THAT THE

SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS PROPOSED BY THE WESTERN SIDE, TOGETHER WITH THE ELEMENTS CONTAINED IN THEIR PROPOSALS OF DEC 16, STILL HAD NOT PROVIDED FOR PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS SINCE THE WESTERN PROPOSALS STILL SOUGHT TO GAIN UNILATERAL ADVANTAGE. THIS WAS INCONSISTENT WITH THE AGREED PRINCIPLES ADOPTED AT THE PRELIMINARY CONSULTATIONS. IN THE PRESENT SESSION, THE CZECHOSLOVAK REP HAD PRESENTED THE ARGUMENTS FOR THIS VIEW. IN PARTICULAR, HE HAD DEMONSTRATED THE GROUNDLESS CHARACTER OF THE WESTERN ASSERTION THAT THE LATEST PROPOSAL WOULD ALLEGEDLY MEANT THAT BOTH MILITARY GROUPINGS WOULD UNDERTAKE EQUITABLE OBLIGATIONS FOR THE REDUCTIONS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES, IN PARTICULAR AS REGARDS THE REDUCTION OF A TANK ARMY AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE STATEMENT MADE BY WESTERN REPS THAT THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS EVEN PROVIDED FOR A LARGER AMOUNT OF ADVANTAGES FOR THE EASTERN COUNTRIES AS COMPARED WITH THE WESTERN COUNTRIES WAS NOT IN HIS VIEW WORTHY OF FURTHER ANALYSIS. EASTERN REPS APPRECIATED HUMOROUS THINGS AND THESE STATEMENTS COULD ONLY BE CONSIDERED AS A JOKE. THEREFORE, THE WESTERN SCHEME OF REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING THE ADDITIONS RECENTLY MADE, HAD THUS BEEN GIVEN A CLEAR EVALUATION BY THE EASTERN SIDE, AND HE WAS CONVINCED THAT THE WESTERN REPS UNDERSTOOD THE EASTERN POINT OF VIEW VERY WELL.

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